Immediacy is the time required to fill customer orders, and, in this sense, the term describes the performance of transaction service providers. The duration of order-fill processing creates exposure to price changes, an exposure that increases as duration of order-fill processing lengthens. This outcome is attributable to both information arrival and market liquidity. More straightforward is information arrival: informed traders want their orders filled before prices adjust to their information. Less straightforward is the added exposure to the price implications of liquidity. Liquidity is a conditional expectation of the association between the price response of a transaction and its size. As large transactions are more likely to move prices, liquidity is usually described in terms of the largest transaction having no expected price impact. Because long-duration order fills increase exposure to these price effects, poor liquidity elevates the importance of immediacy.
Immediacy needs are common to all exchanges. Securities markets are organized to facilitate brokered transactions with a combination of human and computer resources. Specialists holding limit order books provide a nexus for price discovery. Computerized handling of orders meets most immediacy needs by using algorithms to match the buy and sell sides of most at-market orders. Open-outcry futures markets are organized as continuous auction markets. Immediacy is provided by locals who track buy and sell interests on the floor; the transactions of locals serve to intermediate externally originating order flows.
Given the problems arising from lack of immediacy, exchange members have interests in taking steps to achieve immediacy. Increasing the number of members improves the number of opportunities to find a counterparty within a desired time span. Selecting from a homogeneous population of potential members, the choice is straightforward: add members until the immediacy problem goes away. However, potential members are more likely to be heterogeneous, particularly in their credit dimensions. Scarcity of strong credits among a population of potential members constrains immediacy improvements. This paper uses a queuing theory representation to quantify costs implied by inadequate immediacy and develops a tradeoff between these costs and the costs incurred when weak credits are accepted as members.
To see its relevance, consider how membership size affects an exchange member's interests. We readily see the benefit when our grocer opens another checkout line and decreases the portion of a Saturday spent standing in line. Likewise, adding an exchange member can decrease the time spent locating contract counterparties. This is to say that increasing the number of members improves transaction immediacy at a given price. From this, it follows that the cost for obtaining immediacy declines as membership size increases. From the perspective of individual members, every other member is a potential service channel and-like grocery checkout lanes-more service channels are preferred to less.
However, adding members has risk management consequences as well. Baer, France, and Moser show that monitoring members for their nonperformance prospects can substitute for collateralizing against losses.
3 However, they find no evidence of differential collateral assessments as would indicate substantive reliance on monitoring. Collateral appears to be the primary risk management tool, and collateral requirements are the same for most members. This being the case, an increase in the riskiness of new members increases the collateral required from all members.
The literature on financial intermediation has not previously drawn from queuing theory to address financial structural issues. 4 Indeed, use of the theory is infrequent in the general economic literature. Naor includes queue-residence time as a component of all-in product cost. De Vany introduces queuing theory to the industrial organization literature by incorporating wait time into monopoly pricing problems. In their analysis of the trucking industry, De Vany and Saving extend wait time costs to pricing in competitive markets. The empirical study of Frech and Lee gauges the inefficient allocation of gasoline caused by use of wait time as a rationing mechanism other than price. Davidson shows how firms can use wait time preferences to segment service markets.
The next section illustrates concepts of the paper with a numerical illustration for an exchange comprised entirely of principals. The third section models an exchange whose order flow originates externally. Specialization arises as brokers work with external parties to develop order flow. Immediacy providers absorb order flow based on their abilities to track buy and sell interests among the brokers. The fourth section relates exchange rules to efforts to improve the terms of the tradeoff between immediacy demands and exposure to risk. Price tick rules affect the share of revenue obtained by locals, and adjusting these rules can affect local participation in a contract. Price limit rules limit the level of liquid resources required of locals. The final section develops some perspective on the policy implications of the model and summarizes the paper.
Exchange Membership Comprised of Principals
A simulation exercise provides an intuitive basis for this queuing representation. A population of potential exchange members is constructed and ordered by the expected losses incurred by surviving members when any single member fails. For this exercise, members trade for their own account only; that is, they trade as principals. Assuming the clearing organization requires full protection from expected losses, the level of required collateral is the amount of loss exposure implied by the weakest credit permitted to join. Calibrating loss amounts to a Standard and Poor's (S&P) transition matrix of bond ratings adds some realism to the exercise. For each of the possible memberships of size N, the collateral required of all members is the expected loss on failure of the weakest credit. The opportunity cost is the alternative return that members can earn by investing their collateral elsewhere. For purposes of the simulation, this is 5 percent scaled to a contract value of 1,000.
As suggested, adding members increases the number of service channels and decreases expected wait time. Using standard queuing results, I calculate expected wait times for each possible membership size.
5 Assuming that wait time is mutually exclusive of other productive activity, the cost of time in the queue accrues at 5 percent per period. I normalize costs to the servicing cost for one contract servicing period. Thus the all-in cost for one contract is the 5 percent incurred during the servicing interval plus a charge for time spent waiting. If the time spent waiting is 10 percent of the time spent processing, then the additional charge is 0.5 percent (or 5 percent times one-tenth). Table 1 gives the calculated cost schedules for collateral and immediacy. Collateral costs rise gradually from zero to 0.0367 per contract. The steepness arises from the sharp increases in average default losses as bond ratings decline. In contrast, adding new members drives immediacy costs to zero very quickly. For this illustration, combined costs-by construction these are average costs-reach their minimum at five members. Beyond five members, combined costs rise-the steep rise in collateralholding costs dominates a less rapid decline in immediacy costs.
The next section moves away from this specific parameterization and moves toward developing economic intuition for this perspective on a futures exchange.
Specialization within an Exchange Membership
Memberships do not specify the activities of individual members, but members do specialize. Although the term "market maker" connotes a single market for all buy and sell activity, in reality market makers construe their markets much more narrowly. One market maker may be quoting a June-September spread market, while another quotes a market for the September contract only.
This role differentiation also applies to the activities required for servicing orders arriving from nonmembers. Brokers and futures commission merchants (FCMs) specialize in bringing buy and sell orders to the exchange; locals specialize in supplying immediacy. This section expands on this differentiation and models the provision of immediacy services. 
The Immediacy Provisioning Activity of Locals
Brokers focus on bringing order flow to market. This activity precludes time spent keeping track of extant buy and sell interests. As a result, brokers are not well equipped to immediately match a new buy or sell order to another broker seeking to sell or buy. Unlike brokers, locals do not bring order flow to market. Locals fill the need for immediacy by keeping themselves aware of the current buy or sell interests of the brokers. This role separation constitutes a specialization of skills. Brokers specialize in developing and maintaining the external associations needed to bring order flow onto the exchange, and locals specialize in matching buy and sell orders.
Locals accomplish their roles by transacting with brokers to take pieces of broker-originated customer orders. Once the order is parceled out to locals, broker servicing of a customer order is complete. Locals, in turn, then transact to reverse their positions. Those transactions ultimately match to customer orders on the other side. For example, broker A has been negotiating with a customer for a large sell order. In the interim, the buy-sell interests of other brokers could change, so that the task of locating buyers can delay execution of the order. Locals tracking the buy interests of floor brokers will buy portions of the order originated by broker A and then sell the position to brokers presently looking to fill orders for their customers.
The specialization of the activities of locals and brokers requires revising the representation of the exchange provided in the previous section. Orders awaiting service are those held by locals; that is, the waiting area of the queue consists of the positions held by locals. This implies a capacity limitation on the number of orders queued at any instant. The combined financial capacity of locals to carry positions defines this limit, with new orders being rejected on reaching this limit.
The Cost of Adding Liquidity Providers
Loan spreads of the form r -r f compensate for the expected loss and for the risk that the actual loss will exceed the expectations of risk-averse lenders. With an appropriate model, one can parse spread components to extract the expectation of loss. The point of this subsection is to demonstrate how differences in members' expected losses affect their opportunity costs, thus assuming risk neutrality is sufficient for the present purposes and that expected loss is represented as e (r 0 -r f ) -1, where r 0 is the rate for loans extended to member 0 and r f is the default-free rate. Save for their different prospects of default, the loan terms priced in the two rates are matched in all relevant respects, and both are continuously compounded.
Observing the loan spreads available to potential members provides the exchange with useful information on their creditworthiness. Computing expected losses in this way and ranking them lowest to highest provides the exchange with information relevant to its future collateral requirements (see figure 1) .
On reviewing applicant i, member 0 favors the application when the following holds: e (r i -r f ) ≤ e (r 0 -r f ) . This rule holds because adding the new member implies no increase in the costs of risk management. When e (r i -r f ) > e (r 0 -r f ) the new member poses an increased risk that must be managed, and members incur costs associated with managerial effort. 6 Retaining the presumed risk neutrality, the margin collected from the new member covers the loss expected from its contract nonperformance. Comparing a prospective new member to member 0, the amount of extra margin to be collected is e (r i -r f ) -e (r 0 -r f ) . When margin assessments are member specific, then collecting margin sufficient to cover the expected loss owing to that member's nonperformance does not raise the costs for existing members. It follows too that when members cover the risk management costs introduced by their membership, prospects improve that existing members are more likely to favor their admission.
However, exchanges do not differentiate their margin assessments. Instead, margin requirements are uniform, implying that a membership may realize higher costs when admitting new members.
7 Member 0 calculates the cost added by admitting an additional member from three items: the increase in required margin, the rate of return that member 0 can earn on this amount, and the number of contracts on which the added amount 6. Use of a potential member's existing borrowing rate implies that the exchange's access to information about a potential member is no better than the information known by the member's lenders. Neither does the exchange have a comparative advantage in using the information it does have. 7. Although exchanges generally set uniform margins, clearinghouse members can and do assess higher margins for the accounts they clear. This does obtain greater differentiation than implied by exchange rules. The conclusions of this paper obtain, provided margin assessments are less than perfectly elastic with respect to the nonperformance risks of individual members. I am grateful to Pat Parkinson for pointing out this institutional detail. will apply. 8 In a one-member-one-vote organization, members evaluate their benefit from adding new members. Decisions based solely on extra margin cost and improved immediacy will admit new members up to the point where at least (N / 2) + 1 voting members expect positive net benefits.
The preceding characterization demonstrates a relationship between nonperformance costs and the number of memberships. Exchanges add brokers to bring order flow to the exchange; they add locals to improve the immediacy of order fills. Order flow and immediacy are linked through the extent to which immediacy permits brokers to engage in their specialties. Because the value added from order-flow origination is clear, the remainder of the paper focuses on the immediacy implications of adding locals. 
The Value Added by Liquidity Providers
Locals add value by absorbing short-term, order-flow imbalances. A broker bringing a large order to the floor best serves client interests when the order is executed at an average price no less favorable than the market price when the order was given. Simultaneous arrival of identically sized and offsetting orders-a buy for every sell-is unlikely. More likely, the requisite order matches are dispersed among several brokers. "Working the order" is time-consuming; that is, time spent locating selling brokers and negotiating prices detracts from the broker's efforts to bring additional order flow into the exchange. Locals, specializing in tracking existing buy and sell interests on the floor, take positions expecting to trade out of them. 9 The latter trade can be with a selling broker or another local. 10 Figure 2 provides a schematic detailing the order flow being modeled.
For simplicity, I assume that one or more locals immediately take up orders introduced by brokers. In practice, these transactions are less immediate. However, anecdotal evidence suggests this time is generally much shorter than the time spent by locals working their pieces of the order. The assumption permits a simplification: I can represent order flow taken by locals as queued for matches with later-arriving orders.
11
Initially, I also assume that locals take, at most, one contract. In terms of queuing theory, this implies that a local represents one potential queue space. The assumption avoids two complications. First, it enables the analysis to focus on the marginal effect of adding queue spaces rather than the marginal effect of adding locals with each taking more than one order. Second, the assumption sidesteps comparisons of the prospects of contract nonperformance for locals taking multiple contracts.
12 On establishing a 9. Locals carry positions for very short intervals. Silber (1984) calculates average holding periods for a sample of locals. He reports that the average term of their positions is less than two minutes.
10. Offset trades with other locals are more frequent. Curran (2002) shows that during a 1997 sample period broker-to-broker transactions in the S&P 500 contract represented 10 percent of contract volume. All other transactions were broker-to-local (65 percent) or local-to-local (25 percent). Broker-to-local transactions usually are offset to other locals but ultimately are executed by another broker.
11. Queuing theory does offer ways to deal with a series of queues. I find no gains in insight from adding this complexity.
12. For example, a local having weak credit and carrying one contract can pose less credit exposure than a local having stronger credit but carrying 1,000 contracts. tradeoff between immediacy and credit risk, the succeeding section then considers how exchange rules can affect the capacity of locals to carry more positions.
Moser provides performance measures for a queuing model having c service channels and N -c queuing spaces. 13 The model has two stochastic elements: customer inter-arrival time and servicing times, both assumed to be Poisson distributed. I denote expected inter-arrival times as λ and expected service times as µ. With these parameters and assuming a steady state, an expectation for queue length, denoted L q , can be derived. The next three figures convey intuition for the effects from changing service channels (broker) and number of queue space (locals). Figure 3 illustrates the effect on queue length of adding customers with a fixed number of servicing channels. Queue capacity is defined as the maximum number of customers that can be in the system minus the number of service channels. The curve's flatness near the origin occurs because expected queue length is zero when the number of service channels exceeds the number of customers. Beyond that point, expected queue length rises as the number of customers in the system rises. For an exchange, the figure demonstrates that, for a fixed number of brokers (service channels), the need for locals to absorb arriving orders increases as the number of customers increases. Figure 4 illustrates the effect on queue size of increasing the number of service channels for a fixed number of customers. The initial effect on queue size of increasing the number of service channels is, at first, relatively small. As increasing the number of service channels improves the odds that arriving customers will be immediately processed, expected queue size declines more rapidly. As the probability increases that a service channel will be open, queue length declines less rapidly. As before, a service channel is interpreted as a broker. Hence, increasing the number of its active brokers diminishes the need for locals to carry positions.
Moser (forthcoming).
The following differential equation combines the effects of increasing queue capacity (dN, changes in the number of locals) and adding service channels (dc, changes in the number of brokers):
Solving for dN / dc obtains the needed increase in locals for a change in the number of brokers to obtain the same expected queue length. I have evaluated the expression for various numbers of locals and brokers, finding that the number of locals increases, at increasing rates, with the number of brokers.
Cost-Minimizing Behavior
The previous two subsections identify quantities for two costly resources. Managing credit risk entails pledging collateral against nonperformance. The cost of this resource is its use in other productive activities. Time, in particular time spent queued, is the second resource, and its cost is the value of forgone activities. To equilibrate these resource costs, I restate expected queue length as expected queue time: The intuition for the transformation is as follows. In equilibrium expected customer arrivals occur every λ time units. During that interval, those previously residing in the queue expect to advance one space. A counterexample makes the case for this result. Were it not true, the system could not be in equilibrium, as either expected queue length continues to increase or the system goes to zero. Hence, the expected time cost is the value of lost opportunities during queued intervals of length W q . At the margin, the expected rate of return from forgone opportunities equals the expected rate of return from investment opportunities.
14 Were they not equal, resources would be reallocated until meeting the equality condition. Hence, the expected wait time cost for member 0 is e r 0 W q -1. Naturally wait time costs are increasing in W q , the rate of increase is r 0 e r 0 W q > 0. As shown, members can decrease queue length by increasing the number of service channels. It follows that increasing service channels obtains lower wait time costs.
However, scarcity of creditworthiness implies that adding members may require relaxing credit standards and lead to higher costs via greater risk management effort. For simplicity, the exchange manages credit risk entirely through collection of collateral deposits against contracts. This implies that all members post identical amounts of collateral. Hence, adding members increases costs for all members. The amount of cost increase incurred when member 0 takes on a new contract is: that is, the product of the added amount of collateral required from member 0 when member i is admitted and the opportunity cost paid by member 0 when posting additional collateral. This cost increases in r i at the rate e r i -r f +r 0 > 0. Adding members requires comparing the effect of new members on wait time costs that decrease with membership size and on risk management costs that increase with membership size. The optimal decision for member 0 is when the changes in net cost from admitting the new member are zero. This occurs when the following holds: ( ) . When an existing membership makes this decision, each member evaluates the net cost. Proposed new members are admitted when this condition is satisfied for more than N / 2 members. Figure 5 illustrates the margins for these decisions by plotting the dN / dr i curves implied by equation 4. The solid curve represents an exchange having four members, three of which are brokers. The dashed curve increases the number of members to five, and the dotted curve increases that number to six. The curves are positively sloped, demonstrating the value placed on improving immediacy, especially when the number of locals is small. Existing exchange members are willing to incur substantially higher collateral costs when adding members to improve immediacy. Adding new members at lower levels of credit risk implies that existing members realize improved immediacy with lower costs of risk management.
As the number of existing members (N) increases (holding c, the number of brokers, constant), adding members becomes less attractive. For example, despite the credit risk implied by a new member whose cost of funds is 20 percent, members value the improvement in immediacy sufficiently to add nearly three locals (solid line) when the number of existing members is four.
15 However, with five existing members (dashed line), less than two locals are added. Finally, with six members (dotted line), interest in adding locals declines further still.
In conclusion, when immediacy services are scarce, exchange members are willing to pay substantially higher risk management costs to obtain improvements. As the scarcity of this service declines, their willingness to bear these costs also declines.
Exchange Rules Facilitating Entry of Liquidity Providers
The previous section illustrates how exchange memberships resolve tensions between their immediacy needs and the effect that fulfilling those needs has on risk management costs. This section explores the separate interests of brokers and locals to obtain greater insight into the members' decision. A straightforward maximization of the expected profit argument establishes a relatively strong motivation for brokers to resolve immediacy problems. The case for locals seeking similar ends relies on concessions in the form of exchange rules that favor their market-making activities by increasing revenues and limiting their amounts of required cash capital. These rules are consistent with exchanges' pursuit of immediacy. For example, the rules might be conjectured as concessions offered by brokers to attract greater participation by locals.
Broker Interest in Immediacy
Earlier sections use a specialization argument to motivate the interests of brokers for their pursuit of immediacy. Allocating their time between two mutually exclusive activities-working with external customers and market making-immediacy provided by locals permits brokers to work within their specialty. Simple profit maximization strengthens this argument. Recalling the finite queue size developed in the previous section implies, on occasion, an exhaustion of the capacity of locals to accept positions. In these instances, brokers must choose between refusing the orders of current customers or accepting those orders and conducting their own market-making activities. I assume that, in expectations, the cost of either is the same. This is tantamount to assuming that the expected time to work an order precludes accepting the next order as well as assuming equal value added from either activity. Accepting the second of these assumptions seems reasonable; the first is less reasonable for several reasons. First, brokers working their orders have stepped out of their specialties. It is unlikely that their efforts in a market-making capacity will be equally profitable. Second, a market that has used up its immediacy capacity is likely to be a fast market. In these instances, time required to work the order is likely to increase, while the time between order arrivals decreases. Hence, the assumed equality of costs for the brokers' alternatives probably understates the brokers' interests in improved immediacy.
Recalling that N is defined as system capacity, let P N be the probability of N customers being present; that is, all service channels and queuing capacity are in use. Having no additional capacity, brokers must reject new orders until queue space becomes available. Queuing theory refers to this as balking. In such cases, broker profit is nil. During less congested periods, brokers obtain profit denoted π; these times occur with probability (1 -P N ). Hence, expected broker profits can be stated in terms of queue capacity as follows:
Increasing queue capacity clearly reduces the probability of balking and increases profits, that is, This establishes a motivation for brokers to incur costs in their efforts to resolve immediacy problems. Among these costs can be exchange rules that improve immediacy, most especially rules that improve immediacy during fast markets.
Capacity Limits for Locals
Define the local's financial position as V defined in terms of the local's cash position C and the market value of her open positions, that is, as follows:
where F is the futures price, and Q gives the number of open contracts, with the subscripts S and L denoting, respectively, short and long positions. Price changes are marked against the local's position. On obtaining sufficient cash to support her positions, then the local's goal is ∆V = 0. Absent inventory adjustments in response to price changes, then changes in the value of the position are:
Taking expectations and squaring both sides obtain the variance of cash holdings:
so the extent of price variability resulting from the local's net position determines the volatility of changes in cash holdings. The next two subsections provide two routes for affecting the local's willingness to increase the supply of immediacy services.
Tick Size as a Means of Compensating Locals
Exchanges define tick sizes as the minimum amount of nominal price change. Table 2 illustrates with examples for several well-known contracts.
The pricing units used by the underlying cash markets determine tick sizes. This convention, because it eliminates the need to restate futures prices, facilitates futures trading by allowing parties to have ongoing positions in the underlying market. The product of the pricing interval and the notional value of the futures contract obtain the dollar values implied by each minimum tick size. For example, the S&P 500 pricing interval is 1/100 of an S&P point. The notional value of that contract is 250 times the S&P 500, the product (0.01*250) is $2.50. The minimum tick size is ten pricing intervals for a dollar value of $25.00.
Consider two possibilities: the contract trades at its pricing interval of 2.50 or at its minimum tick size of 25.00. The bid-offer prices quoted by locals will be multiples of 2.50 or 25.00. At a 2.50 pricing increment, the bid-offer spread can be bid down as low as 2.50. At 25.00, the bid-offer spread can only be bid down to 25.00. In exchange parlance, both are
"one-tick markets." The first implies that local compensation is $2.50 per trade; the second gives compensation of $25.00 per trade. Choices between these alternatives have a straightforward effect on the supply of locals. Tick-size contract specifications amount to a form of price administration having two effects. 16 First, recognize that perceived instances of market failure are an important motivation for administering prices. In the present instance, the minimum tick size assures that the supply of immediacy-providing locals will be higher than may result were the minimum lower. In terms of the value of a local's position, price administration prevents the local from incurring a market-determined bid-offer rate below 25.00. Recalling the earlier point that exchanges do not manage member specialties, the exchange must rely on incentives to adopt needed specialties. This floor on per contract compensation improves the revenues of locals provided contract volume is sufficiently inelastic to its consequent bid-offer spread.
Second, noting that price variation accumulates over time, minimum price increments increase the time a local has to reverse out of a position. Referring to the previous example, define average deviations in equilibrium prices for one-minute holding periods as 2.50. A local can expect no less than five minutes to offset a position before equilibrium price changes can be expected to round up (or down) to the next allowable pricing increment of 25.00. Were the minimum price interval to be 2.50, the local would have less than one minute to offset the position. 17 Locals seeking to avoid exposure to price changes will prefer contract terms that offer sufficient time to close out their positions.
Price Limits as a Means of Reducing the Costs of Carrying Cash Balances
Miller and Orr derive optimal balances for zero-drift cash accounts when cash holdings have an opportunity cost denoted v and replenishing account balances costs γ per transaction. 18 The optimal balance z * is where σ c 2 is the variance in dollar terms of net inflows and outflow of cash. Substituting for σ c 2 with the variance of futures prices (see equation 8) and taking the derivative with respect to σ F 2 give the effect of a change in price volatility on the position:
The local's net position is (Q L -Q s ), so from equation 10 we can conclude that the optimal level of cash balances rises with the volatility of prices, with time, and with the cost of replenishing the cash balance. The optimal level of cash balances falls as the opportunity cost for cash balances rises. Figure 6 depicts the effect of futures price volatility on optimal cash balances for a single contract over one holding period, with a one-period opportunity cost of 5 percent of the cash replenishment cost. The relation's steepness suggests that price volatility has an important role in determining the activities of the local. Holding constant revenue opportunities per dollar of available cash balances, locals prefer low-over high-volatility positions. It is appropriate to understand this decision as a long-run choice.
( ) ( -) . 17. These examples presume that tick-size conventions obscure equilibrium prices. Thus equilibrium prices fall within a range defined as 1 ⁄ 2 pricing increment above or below an observed price.
18. Miller and Orr (1966, 1968) .
For the short run, locals can lessen their need for cash balances by adjusting their net positions. Similarly, Telser relates the short-run adjustment process to the isomorphism between cash and futures contracts introduced.
19 Facing a shortfall in cash balances, the local chooses between making an inventory adjustment and paying γ to replenish the cash account. Thus reducing the instances requiring the replenishment of cash balances lessens the need for locals to adjust inventory.
Price limits establish ceilings on the cash amounts that can be required within a single trading day. To see this, consider a contract whose specifications call for dropping the price limit on the day following a day in which the close price is the limit price. This implies that σ 2 c (t) < 0.5σ 2 c (2t), where the arguments in parentheses define the intervals for which variances are computed. 20 As demonstrated, this reduction in cash flow variance reduces the level of cash needed to support the position. The effect is obtained by smoothing cash flow needs across days.
19. Telser (1986) . 20. The inequality is weakened when the probability of a price change reaching the limit is nil. Increasing the period over which a price shock can affect cash balances benefits a local in two ways. First, when the change results from an excessive response to a price shock, a price reversal can be expected. The local benefits by a reduction in cash needed to restore the account. Second, increasing the amount of time available to replenish the account increases the opportunities to liquidate other holdings or to renegotiate loan terms. In both instances, as developed in Moser, the local has the equivalent of a zero-interest loan from the winning side of the contract. 21 Reducing the effective rate for carrying cash balances decreases the cost locals incur when they carry positions during volatile markets. Absent this cost reduction, locals might be expected to exit when prices become volatile, having the effect of reducing immediacy as volatility rises. Kuserk and Locke show that locals are more likely to carry overnight positions when price limits are hit than when limits are not hit. 22 This suggests that the value of these implicit loans is sufficient to alter the behavior of locals, who continue to supply immediacy despite the risk that they will face overnight exposure to price changes.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
Economic models affect policy choices by altering the way in which we understand economic choices. Knowledge that a tax distorts choices in predictable ways gives the policymaker a sense of the cost and benefit implied by changes in the tax. It follows that improving the predictability of a response improves the policymaker's effectiveness. This is particularly important for the regulatory style referred to as "incentive compatible." This regulatory style rewards regulated firms for their compliance with social goals. As well-structured reward systems require full understanding of organizational structure, models that parsimoniously convey structural understanding are more conducive to effective regulatory policy. The key contribution of this paper comes through its illustration of linkage between immediacy levels supplied by exchange membership and the creditworthiness of their membership. Incorporating this perspective into the policy formulation process can improve its effectiveness at minimum by avoiding policy choices that conflict with alreadypresent incentives.
The fundamental cause(s) of the market break of October 1987 probably will never be understood, in part because the market mechanism itself became part of the problem. 23 What comes through clearly is the dramatic decline in the capacity of market makers during the break. At the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), broker transactions involving locals averaged 46 percent of all contracts during the three days prior to the crash. On October 19, this declined to 31.4 percent of contract volume and on the following day fell yet again to 24.1 percent. 24 As CME market-making capacity declined, selling shifted from the CME to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), overwhelming the NYSE price reporting system. The lack of timely price information added to uncertainty and heightened selling pressure.
Although an extreme case, the 1987 crash illustrates the linkage between immediacy and creditworthiness. On Black Monday, locals bought 48,487 contracts, selling all but 1,743 before market close. As the price trend over the day was sharply down, most locals ended the day with losses. These losses played an important role in decisions that substantially reduced the participation of locals later the same day and the day following. This decline in immediacy at the futures exchange moved selling pressure to New York. Despite this connection, credit extended for market-making activities appears to have gone to NYSE specialists. This is not a criticism of the private credit decisions made during this period, but there may be grounds for criticizing an apparent lack of concern for the public's interest. It is fair to question whether credit extended to locals at the futures exchanges might have served the public interest more effectively than the same amount of credit provided to NYSE specialists. Arguably concerns over the viability of the futures clearinghouses precluded this credit allocation. If so, solving these problems opens another avenue of response in some future crash. That is to say, a solution to clear-inghouse viability problems that puts both stock and futures markets on equal credit standing reopens the question as to where a credit allocation can best serve the public interest.
A second policy issue is the effect that electronic trading will have. On its face, the cost advantages of electronic trading are so great it is difficult to imagine open outcry having much of a future. However, the immediacy problems noted by Miller remain unsolved. 25 Open outcry probably will persist as long as electronic trading operates as a messaging system. Message systems speed up order routing, but improving order routing is not sufficient for improving immediacy; orders must also be executed.
Electronic trading must also replicate the immediacy provided by locals in open-outcry markets. When operated as a messaging system, every trader is a potential immediacy provider, or not. As is the case with a specialist, immediacy providers face the prospect of trading at an information disadvantage. To succeed, the messaging system must convey information that can be used to mitigate this disadvantage. In open-outcry markets, successful locals have learned to extract information from market activity. This information is not conveyed by screen-based trading systems. This constrains effective mitigation of the information disadvantage. Absent routes to avoid being disadvantaged, prospective immediacy providers will require compensation proportional to the level of risk. At times, this cost may deter trading. This is not to argue that electronic trading cannot succeed; these problems can be overcome. Open-outcry markets developed solutions for immediacy problems before they became subject to regulatory oversight. Electronic exchanges must achieve similar innovations while satisfying their regulators. At least two problems arise from this need. First, regulators stand to be criticized when negative outcomes are realized but are not rewarded when outcomes are positive. This payout structure explains the near universality of risk aversion among regulators. Second, innovations that threaten the viability of existing competitors motivate attempts to influence regulators for purposes of protecting the status quo. Existing competitors can be expected to provide detailed explanations as to how adoption of proposed innovations may cause regulators to realize the negative outcomes they fear.
Foreseeing these difficulties, in 1993 the Chicago Board of Trade proposed a "pro markets" approach that segmented market participants by a combination of financial sophistication and capacity to suffer losses. This initiative, itself unsuccessful, ultimately led to adoption of this regulatory philosophy in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act in December 2000. That act enables the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to effect a multitiered regulatory structure. The commission envisions exchanges operating as either designated contract markets, as derivatives transaction execution facilities (DTFs), or as multilateral transaction execution facilities (MTEFs). The general public is eligible to participate in designated contract markets; consequently the regulatory oversight of these exchanges is most restrictive. Eligibility at DTFs is limited to cash market participants-that is, traders making or taking delivery. Participation in MTEFs is limited to traders representing institutional firms. Oversight of the latter is minimal, limited to fraud and manipulation concerns. At this point, this regulatory framework appears to remove regulatory impediments that might otherwise deter innovators from solving the immediacy problems noted by Professor Miller. The future of futures appears to one of interesting times.
Comment and Discussion
Comment by Pat Parkinson: Jim Moser's paper focuses on membership policies for exchanges, and that is certainly one element of risk management. He notes that, on the one hand, broader membership facilitates immediacy and mitigates the market risks associated with delays in filling orders, but, on the other hand, broader membership may expose exchange members to increased counterparty credit risk. And he uses queuing theory to quantify the terms of this tradeoff and analyze various ways of improving on it.
In the world of securities clearance and settlement, it is often said that time equals risk, and in that context this means that the longer is the duration between trade execution and settlement, the greater is the risk of credit losses from counterparty defaults. As I was reading the paper, it occurred to me that time equals risk also applied to my comments and that the longer I discuss this paper, the greater is the risk that you will become aware that I know nothing about queuing theory and not very much about the design of exchanges and determinants of immediacy. I have been in grocery store lines and in fact used to work in a grocery store, so perhaps I am overqualified. However, not knowing the relevance of my grocery store experience, I decided to manage the risk by discussing Moser's paper only briefly before offering my own overview of the current issues in securities clearance and settlement.
With respect to the paper, I would like to make just two comments. The first relates to the critical assumption that all exchange members face the same margin requirements. That is the assumption that creates the tradeoff between immediacy and credit risk. The exchange is assumed to set the margin requirement to cover the potential credit losses from the least creditworthy member, who, by definition or by construction, is the newest member. Thus adding members leads to higher margin requirements on existing exchange members, and this cost offsets the benefits of expanded membership in terms of greater immediacy. I find that assumption troubling: the costs of the policy clearly are significant, and, more important, they are readily avoidable simply by adjusting the margin requirements to reflect the creditworthiness of individual members-charging a higher margin requirement on the less creditworthy members than on the more creditworthy members.
To be fair, the paper argues that, although this may be true in principle, in practice exchanges do not always tailor their margin requirements to reflect the creditworthiness of individual members. In the over-the-counter derivatives markets, margin requirements are frequently, or even generally, tied to counterparties' creditworthiness. The amount of uncollateralized exposure that is permitted under a bilateral credit agreement decreases as the counterparty's credit rating is downgraded, so he gets less uncollateralized exposure.
Furthermore, some exchanges do vary margin requirements across members. One example is the Options Clearing Corporation. In addition to imposing margin requirements, which are based on trying to cover 95 or 99 percent of potential price movements, it conducts daily stress tests of the impact of much larger price changes on exposures to their members. And if the simulated potential uncollateralized exposure exceeds a certain specified percentage of that member's capital, the member has three choices: it can put up additional margin, it can put more capital into whatever subsidiary is carrying the positions, or it can pare back its positions, but basically one of the options is to put up more margin.
Other exchanges set different sets of margin requirements for two fundamentally different classes of members: the clearing members and the nonclearing members. That brings me to my second point: the importance of this distinction between clearing members and other clearing members in clearing arrangements for exchanges, whether they are futures exchanges or securities exchanges.
Moser notes that the exchanges' trading arrangements often involve a specialization of functions, and the same is true in clearing. Typically, only some members of the exchange also are members of the clearing organization. The clearing organization acts as the central counterparty to trades on the exchange and manages the risks of all the unsettled trades.
Clearing members then act as intermediaries between the clearinghouse and the other members. In fact, if you want to be a member of the exchange, but not a clearing member, you must find someone to clear your trades; you cannot trade without having someone to clear for you. Now, clearing members have the right to impose higher margin requirements on those for whom they act. The exchange generally sets a minimum margin requirement, but the clearing member has the discretion to charge a higher one. And it is my perception they make use of that flexibility much more so than do the exchanges themselves. But, again, this gives less creditworthy members access to the exchange floor without imposing higher margin requirements on everyone. Exchanges also typically closely monitor their clients and constrain their risk taking in various other ways, and of course this benefits both the exchange and its clearing organization.
Turning to the question of securities clearance and settlement generally, during the past ten years or so there has been considerable progress in understanding the nature of risks in clearing and settlement and the approaches to reducing those risks and managing most effectively what remains. Furthermore, national markets have made a lot of progress in implementing those approaches. The greatest concerns about clearing and settlement pertain to the efficiency of existing arrangements. In particular, global securities firms and custodian banks are troubled by the fact that there has been relatively little or no progress in integrating national systems. There are one or more settlement systems in each country and a lack of global integration, and they feel that we are failing to realize potential economies of scale and scope that could be realized from greater integration.
In terms of where things are relatively well settled, it is now widely recognized that securities settlements entail not only counterparty credit risks, which the paper has focused on, but also legal risks, operational risks, and custody risks. All of those risks need to be managed effectively by the entities charged with that responsibility. In the case of counterparty credit risk, time truly does equal risk, and shortening the interval between trade and settlement reduces counterparty risks.
Probably the most important initiative within the United States, with respect to securities clearance and settlement, is a major effort by the Securities Industry Association to shorten the settlement cycle for equities and other corporate municipal securities from the current three business days, or T + 3, to one business day, or T + 1. Worldwide there is appreciation of the need to link securities transfer systems to payment systems in a way that achieves delivery versus payment; in other words, in a way that eliminates the possibility that a seller could deliver securities and not get paid or the buyer could make his payment and not receive delivery.
In this area, again, there are specialized intermediaries. Two types of intermediaries lie at the heart of the process in a growing number of markets, certainly in the United States and in more and more other markets as well. One of these is a so-called central securities depository (CSD), which immobilizes or even dematerializes the securities and transfers them by book entry rather than by physically moving certificates. They then achieve delivery versus payment by creating a link to a payment system or by organizing as a bank and internalizing those payments and making them on their own books.
The second type of institution is a central counterparty, or CCP, which, as the name suggests, is a buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer, either directly or through an intermediary clearing member. Moser focuses primarily on futures exchanges, which, in the United States and elsewhere in the world, have always had a CCP at the heart of the settlement system. In the United States there has been a CCP for equities since the late nineteenth century, but a CCP for government securities was introduced only about ten years ago. And most markets abroad do not yet have CCPs, although the number of CCPs has been growing recently. This feeds into the concerns about a lack of integration, because you are getting a lot of investments in new central counterparties where some think a single CCP serving multiple markets would be a more efficient solution.
And, as Moser has noted, those CCPs typically manage risk, not only through collateral requirements but also through legal mechanisms for netting obligations-both novation, which essentially is netting security by security, and closeout netting, which provides that, if a member defaults, and, say, he is long IBM, you will sell out the IBM, and if he is short General Motors, you will buy that in, and you will net the gains and losses and only be out the net amount. Now, because both CSDs and CCPs lie at the heart of the settlement system, it is critical that those entities manage the risks they assume very effectively. In recent years, a key has been the development of standards for risk management for those kinds of intermediaries, including the recent recommendations for securities settlement systems by the G10 Central Banks' Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Those recommendations were finalized last November. In the area of CSDs, the issue is whether they can, in fact, settle all the transactions on the settlement date in a timely fashion. A key issue is that CSDs often extend credit on an intraday basis to their participants to facilitate the transaction, either explicitly by allowing them to overdraft funds accounts, either with the CSD itself or in some other payment system, or implicitly by settling the payment obligations associated with securities transactions on a net basis.
Among other requirements, we call for CSDs that extend credit to meet what has become known as the Lamfalussy Standard. The Lamfalussy Standard requires a CSD to institute risk controls, which, at a minimum, ensure that it can settle, even if the participant with the very largest payment obligation is unable to settle. In other words, for people familiar with domestic issues relative to bank deposit insurance, no participant in those systems is to be considered too big to fail. You cannot assume that, just because a participant is large and even well capitalized, you do not need to manage the risk vis-à-vis that participant.
In the case of CCPs, rather than developing our own standards, a new group called CCP-12, which includes representatives of CCPs, not only in the United States but also in Europe, Asia, Brazil, and other places in the Americas, is developing standards to address the full range of risks that CCPs face. The CCP-12 is devoting special attention to the need for more robust standards for business continuity plans. This may be slowing down its work, especially in the aftermath of the disruptions to payments and settlements that occurred in the United States after the tragic events of September 11.
The main thing on the horizon is a study that was initiated last year by the Group of 30, called the Global Clearance and Settlement Study. Back in 1989 the G-30 issued some very influential recommendations on clearance and settlement that have been of lasting value, although-as even they recognize-they have become somewhat dated. The focus of that new study will be the settlement of cross-border trades and the challenges posed by the lack of integration of clearance settlement across national markets. This is very timely in part because cross-border trading volumes have grown so rapidly, much more rapidly than volume security settlements generally and in part because, although the European Union has a common currency, there are about a dozen CSDs in the eurozone. By all estimates, the cost of settling trades in Europe greatly exceeds the cost of settling those trades in the United States, where we have a unified infrastructure; settlements of cross-border trades are especially costly. The global securities firms and custodian banks must be right, at least in part, in believing that this is attributable to the failure to achieve economies of scale and scope, through consolidation or integration of those European systems.
In turn, they see the failure to consolidate or integrate as reflecting structural impediments to competition in clearance and settlement as well as some weaknesses in the governance arrangements for CSDs and CCPs in particular. Obviously, weaknesses that tend to slight the interests of those global players are of particular concern to them. As an example of a competitive impediment, some of the exchanges in Europe require all trades executed through their systems to be settled through their affiliated clearance and settlement systems. In fact, one very significant barrier to change here is that, in many of those cases, the revenues from clearance and settlement constitute a very large proportion of the overall revenues of the exchange. So, allowing competition, which could jeopardize those revenues, is difficult to do. The other point is that the boards of directors tend to be dominated either by the exchanges in the marketplace or by local banks and brokers, and their interests clearly diverge, in many cases, from the interests of the global firms trading on a cross-border basis. Now, the G-30 work is still in progress, but the broad outline of their strategy for enhancing the efficiency of cross-border settlements is becoming clear. It involves a combination of steps: first, to reduce the cost of the existing fragmentation, and, second, to promote consolidation where that makes sense.
Many in the securities industry believe that new technology can facilitate what has become a real buzzword-interoperability of multiple settlement systems. That is a term in need of more precise definition, but, in effect, they would like to have multiple systems, but users could interface with those multiple systems as if there were only a single one. There might be a single gateway, for example, that would permit access to all the systems. To get there, to achieve interoperability, the various systems would have to adopt certain common practices and technologies. The G-30 is trying to identify the areas where standards are needed and the standards that are appropriate and then to establish a process to get people to agree to implement those standards.
Interoperability clearly would reduce the costs associated with the need to maintain multiple interfaces that employ incompatible standards and procedures, and it would enable more effective competition between clearance and settlement systems, which is the key, or at least is certainly one way of ensuring that, over time, consolidation occurs where it makes sense. I do not think that interoperability by itself is going to ensure that those competitive forces are allowed to play out. National pride and cultural differences are going to remain significant impediments to change. It took us many, many years to close down the depositories in Chicago and Philadelphia-long after those stopped making economic sense. It remains to be seen within Europe whether the competition authorities will take action against those exchanges whose rules are requiring the tying of trading and settlement.
On the governance side, better governance arrangements are needed. In particular, the CPSS-IOSCO standards call for meeting the needs of different classes of users. How you reconcile those conflicts in practice is not exactly clear, however, and they are not going to go away.
To conclude, the G-30 project is very important, very ambitious, and more challenging than the 1989 project. Therefore, there is a greater risk that it will not be as successful. But the people involved are the very best people around, and the potential gains clearly are very large.
Discussion: David Crosen suggested that the author could set up a precise willingness-to-pay schedule for improving the settlement technology of the exchange. He believed it would be possible to calculate benefits, in terms of reduced costs and better capacity of the locals to process the number of orders per unit of time. He asked whether it would be worthwhile for an exchange or a broker to make this investment on behalf of the locals in order to improve the efficiency of the system. Hans Stoll commented that Moser's model predicts the opposite of what is being observed in equities markets, where the number of specialist firms has rapidly declined. He asked whether the model is specific to futures exchanges and whether the same trend is visible in that market.
One participant noted that, in Europe, exchanges are allowed to own the clearing and settlement system and that clearing and settlement have the features of a natural monopoly. He asked whether there are anticompetitive dangers in such a policy, and hence whether a policy that divorces clearing and settlement from exchanges should be favored. Moser agreed with this assessment, saying that, in his paper, he broke up the industry in terms of the order gatherers, the exchanges, and the clearing and settlement process and specifically suggested that there should be very few clearing and settlement agencies and a limited number of exchanges.
Asani Sarkar argued that there are some efficiency gains from vertical integration to straight-through processing. Ruben Lee suggested that this is controversial and that the head of the London Clearinghouse, which deals with five or six different exchanges, says unequivocally that he has straight-through processing, but not in a vertically integrated environment. Parkinson agreed, saying that straight-through processing can exist even when the clearing organization is not affiliated with the exchange, as the London Clearinghouse example demonstrates.
Lee also asked how and whether competition between central counterparties can come into existence. Parkinson suggested that, to make competition effective, a link between the two central counterparties has to exist, since someone who chooses to clear through one central counterparty has to be able to settle with someone who chooses to clear through the other central counterparty. However, he noted that such a link involves substantial fixed costs and may be economically unjustified in cases where few members want them. A balance has to be found between allowing a critical mass to create links and not allowing complete freedom to create links due to the potential for runaway costs.
A participant wanted to know how to handle the series of counterparty risk and coordination problems that come up when clearing and settlement agencies are located in different countries and different time zones. Parkinson noted that people all over the globe are trading securities issued in the United States and traded on the New York Stock Exchange and are settling those trades through a variety of means. He said that two of the common means are to hire an international bank or to use a local agent in the United States.
Parkinson also agreed that the time zone question is difficult, since getting to T + 1 involves either operating round-the-clock or settling the trade very quickly. Moreover, if the infrastructure is not available, trades would fail and costs would be incurred due to exception processing, which is expensive. He noted that a massive multiyear plan to achieve straightthrough processing is a necessary precondition for T + 1, because going to T + 1 in the current environment, where manual intervention and the use of paper reign, would lead to massive failures and not achieve any benefits.
Lee wanted to distinguish between clearing and settlement and hence to know whether it is more possible to have competition between central securities depositories than to have competition between central counterparties. Parkinson gave the example of Europe, where the Euroclear settlement system as part of the Euronext alliance has been essentially snapping up or merging into their organization the central securities depositories in France, in Belgium, in the Netherlands. These have become Euroclear France, Euroclear Netherlands, and so on; hence there are still some operations in the country, and some national pride is satisfied. Nonetheless, efficiency benefits are realized by imposing common systems.
Frank Edwards suggested that Lee's question on whether competition is possible has to be answered by first clarifying what is meant by competition. In his view, a competitive market exists not necessarily when there are a lot of providers, but when there are low barriers to entry. This condition does not appear to obtain in clearing and settlement. Parkinson nonetheless suggested that competition is possible, but currently prohibited by the rules. However, from a public policy standpoint, simply saying that these rules should be abolished and that members should be allowed to settle trades through any clearing system is not entirely desirable in terms of efficiency. He admitted that he does not know what the most efficient policy should be, but he also noted that the toughest issues in clearing and settlement do not center on risk management. Instead they center on issues of industrial organization, like those faced by competition authorities in Europe who are concerned about tying clearing with the execution of trades and who want to instill more competition without imposing unreasonable burdens on the exchanges.
Lee responded that some rules inhibiting competition are easy to eliminate, citing as an example when an exchange ties the clearing of trades executed on that exchange to a particular clearinghouse or central counterparty. But eliminating such rules might fail to promote competition because network externalities might tilt participants toward the use of a central counterparty in any event. Parkinson disagreed, saying that it is possible for efficient competitors to take shares away from incumbents. He pointed to the clearing of government securities where Euroclear entered and took a large share of the settlement volumes in Europe because that network was more efficient. In turn, the other local central securities depositories themselves became more efficient.
Ken Roy Dobbs pointed out that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have revealed that many countries are beneath the standards for risk management recommended by the International Organization of Securities Commissions. He believed that international competition is helping to upgrade domestic clearing systems in this respect.
